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ABSTRACT 
Digital works such as images, audio and video present security concerns due to their 
portability and error free reproducibility. Thus, digital work producers are not being 
properly compensated for copyrighted works that are illegally copied and distributed on 
the Internet. One solution that has been proposed to solve some of these problems is 
digital watermarking. Researchers have proposed many different watermarking methods, 
but for any of these methods to be commercially applicable, they must be secure in the 
sense of being resilient to all known watermarking attacks. Therefore, the exploration 
and examination of watermarking attacks must be exhaustive. This paper adds to the 
knowledge base of known watermarking attacks on digital video. Specifically a type of 
collusion attack based on the replacement attack strategy is applied and tested against 
two digital video watermarking schemes. The effectiveness of this attack is measured by 
evaluating the fidelity of the attacked video as well as the ability of the attack to remove 
the watermark. This attack will provide yet another quality standard for measuring the 
effectiveness of watermarking schemes. This standard must be met if watermarking is 
to be a commercially viable option. 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Since the advent of digital works there has been an increased interest of digital 
watermarking. Digital technologies such as streaming audio and video, personal video 
recorders, DVD, and MPEG compression standards present new security concerns due 
to their portability and error free reproducibility. One solution that has been proposed 
to solve some of these problems is digital watermarking. Digital watermarking is the 
process of hiding data within a digital work, such that the data is imperceptible to the 
user of the work, difficult to remove without destroying the work, but detectible by 
applying a specific detection algorithm [4] . 
Over the past decade, researchers have proposed many watermarking methods that 
can be used to solve these problems. If these methods are to be commercially applica-
ble, they must be secure in sense of being resilient to all known watermarking attacks. 
Therefore, an evaluation of the effectiveness of digital watermarking schemes demands 
an exhaustive exploration of watermarking attacks. It is the purpose of this paper to 
evaluate the effectiveness of a known attack strategy applied to digital video watermarks. 
1.2 Contribution 
Most research on digital watermarking has been done on images. Although these 
watermarks can be readily applied to video by separating the video into frames, digital 
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video watermarking presents a new set of problems and attacks that are not applicable to 
images. One attack that is exclusive to video is the collusion attack. A collusion attack 
attempts to create awatermark-free work by using redundant data which is contained not 
only within individual frames but also between video frames. Digital video watermarks 
are more susceptible to collusion attacks than image watermarks because of the amount 
of data contained within a video and the redundancy between frames. The current 
United States standard, NTSC, plays video at a rate of 29.97 frames per second. [18J 
This rate provides ample redundancy for a collusion attack within a fraction of a second 
of video. 
This paper will add to the knowledge base of known watermarking attacks on digital 
video. Specifically a type of collusion attack based on the replacement attack strategy 
will be applied and tested against digitial video watermarks. The replacement attack 
was first introduced by Kirovski and Petitcolas in their paper, Replacement Attach on 
Arbitrary Watermarl~ing Systems which implemented a replacement attack on digital 
audio [13] . This paper will build on the replacement attack by extending it to digital 
video and testing its effectiveness against two digital video watermarking techniques. 
The effectiveness of this attack will be measured by evaluating the fidelity of the attacked 
video as well as the ability of the attack to successfully remove the watermark. 
Implementing this attack on digital video instead of digital audio presents several 
problems not covered by Kirovski and Petitcolas. First, digital audio is a one dimensional 
signal while video is a three dimensional signal and thus the blocks used in the attack 
must be adjusted. Also, fidelity concerns differ when working with digital video rather 
than digital audio. 
This attack will provide yet another quality standard for measuring the security of 
future watermarking schemes. This standard must be met if watermarking is to be a 
commercially viable option. 
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1.3 Roadmap 
Chapter 2 discusses proposed application areas of watermarks. Chapter 3 defines 
watermarking by looking at the process and how it may be evaluated. Chapter 4 reviews 
two video watermarking algorithms and presents different types of attacks on digital 
video watermarks. Chapter 5 presents the attack applied in this work and how the 
attack will be evaluated. Chapter 6 presents the results of the attack and. a discussion 
of the results. Chapter 7 sums up the contribution of this paper and presents areas for 
future work. 
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CHAPTER 2. Watermarking Applications 
Digital watermarking is a new area of research and has only recently begun to attract 
widespread interest. Papers published on watermarking have gone from a few in the early 
90s to over 250 in 1999 [4]. However, traditional paper watermarking has been around 
since the 13th century [4]. 'I~aditional paper watermarking has many applications today. 
A prominent example of paper watermarking is the American currency system. If a $5, 
$10 or $20 bill is held up to the light a faint portrait of a US president is visible on 
the right side of the bill. This image is a watermark embedded in the bills to prevent 
counterfeiting. 
Parallels can be drawn between this type of watermark and a digital watermark. For 
example, the watermark contained on a $20 bill is not visible under normal conditions. 
It can only been seen when a detection process is applied to the bill. In the case of 
currency, this process is holding it up to the light [4J. Digital watermarking attempts to 
be impreceptible as well. This property of unobtrusiveness is a fundamental property 
of digital watermarking. Under normal circumstances, while viewing or listening to 
a digital work the watermark should not be detectable by the user. The watermark 
should only be detectable by applying an extraction algorithm. Money watermarks are 
also extremely hard to remove without destroying the bill. This robustness property is 
also desired in digital watermarking. A user should not be able to destroy or remove a 
digital watermark without destroying the digital work. 
Traditional paper watermarks are useful today and serve a clear purpose in protecting 
content. This type of watermarking has been in use for a long time, but it is only recently 
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that it has been applied to digital works. However, the application of this concept to 
digital works remains uncertain. Whether, and by what means, digital watermarks can 
be effectively used in today's digital world is not yet established. There have been many 
watermarking schemes proposed, but their ultimate efficacy as a means of protecting 
digital content is not yet proven. 
2.1 Copyright Protection and Proof of Ownership 
One of major problem that has eluded solution by digital work producers has been 
copyright protection. Since digital works are merely binary data, it can easily be copied 
and distributed on the Internet or on physical media without loss Of quality [7~ . Digital 
watermarking is proposed to solve this problem by embedding a watermark signal into 
the digital works such that every time the digital work is copied the watermark will also 
be copied. 
In the past, copyrighted material could be identified under law by simply placing a 
copyright notice in the form "~c date owner" somewhere within the content. The same 
concept can be applied to digital work but this type of protection is easily defeated by 
simply cropping the photo such that the copyright symbol is no longer visible or by 
otherwise deleting the notice [4~ . In view of this, watermarking has been proposed to 
solve several areas of copyright protection. 
Most watermarks are made to be imperceptual to the user and hard to extract 
without knowing some information about the watermark. This property makes them 
effective copy protection tools. Users are able to show their ownership of the work by 
showing the existence of their watermark within the work in question but unauthorized 
duplicators are not able to remove the watermarks without destroying the fidelity of the 
work. 
Suppose Alice has a photo that she would like to publish but still protect from being 
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used without her consent. Bob decides he would like to use the photo but does not 
obtain Alice's consent. In the past Bob v~7ould be able to remove the copyright symbol 
and claim ownership of the photo. Alice would then have to provide some form of original 
copy such as a negative to prove that she was the original creator [4]. Suppose instead 
that Alice watermarks her photo before releasing it to the public. When Bob claims the 
photo is his, Alice is able to refute the argument with digital proof that the photo is 
hers via the watermark. The above example is one way in which digital watermarking 
may be used for copyright protection and proof of ownership. 
2.2 Transaction Tracking 
'I~ansaction tracking is another application of digital watermarking. In this type of 
watermark application, a unique watermark is placed in each copy of the distributed 
work [4~. Then, if a work is misused, the owner is able to track down the original 
malicious user by extracting the watermark and linking the watermark to a specific 
user. This type of application would be useful for example in tracking persons who 
illegally distribute copyrighted works over the Internet. 
The DivX Corporation applied this technology in its service which offered a pay per 
view movie scheme [4]. In an attempt to track illegally recorded and distributed movies, 
DivX players would embed a watermark into the video as it was played. If the video 
was illegally recorded and pirated the watermark could be extracted from pirated DivX 
videos and tracked back to the original user [4]. 
2.3 Copy Control 
Copy control attempts to prevent users from making illegal copies of digital works. 
Traditionally, encryption has been the main way in which to accomplish this task [4] . A 
"Content Scrambling System" or CSS was implanted on DVD video in order to thwart 
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malicious users from making illegal copies of digital video. This encryption has been 
defeated by reverse engineering DVD players. Thus DVDs are now easily copied and 
distributed on the Internet [16J . 
Digital television producers are also looking for an effective method of copy control. 
The Federal Communications Commission has mandated that all television broadcasts 
go digital by the year 2006 [lo] . Converting to digital television will benefit consumers 
by providing a better product and increasing the amount of data that can be sent within 
the scarce frequency space allocated for digital television. However, as digital television 
becomes reality, it also becomes clear that it will be easier to copy and redistribute 
without loss of quality. A strong copy control watermark could help solve the problem 
of illegal digital television copying and distribution. 
Watermarking has been proposed to solve the problem of copy control. By inserting 
a watermark into digital works, producers are able to control which devices or software 
are able to read the digital data. For example, suppose a software media player has a 
built in watermark detector. Before any work is played, the player attempts to detect 
a watermark within the work. If a watermark is found, then the player decodes the 
watermark to receive instructions about handling the work. The instructions may tell 
the player that the work may be copied once or that may be viewable for a certain time 
period. 
The major hurdle to this is convincing producers to manufacture and consumers 
to buy specific hardware and software that is able to detect watermarks. If there is 
hardware or software that does not have a watermark detector, the watermark becomes 
useless. Bloom et al. proposed a solution for this by coupling a mark on the- physical 
media along with the digital watermark embedded into the work [1] . 
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2.4 Content Authentication 
This application attempts to preserve the integrity of the digital work. Again, in 
today's digital world, it is easy to manipulate digital works. Programs like Adobe 
PhotoshopTMand The Gimp make it easy to modify images. Watermarking proposes to 
solve this problem by inserting a watermark such that any modification of the digital 
works will destroy the watermark and it will therefore be provable that the work has 
been altered. 
In the past cryptography has been used to achieve integrity of digital works [4] . 
Digital signatures and hashing have been proven as an effective way to achieve digital 
integrity. However, cryptography requires that additional information be included along 
with the digital work. If this additional information is corrupted but the digital work 
remains intact, then the integrity of the work is lost. Another weakness is the inflexi-
bility of digital signatures or hashes. For example, if a picture undergoes JPEG or GIF 
compression the digital signature or hash would show that the digital work has been cor-
rupted even though the physical representation of the work is still in tact. A watermark 
that is able to survive compression without a major change in physical representation 
of the digital work would be useful in this case. 
This would be useful in the area of forensics. Law enforcement could use watermark-
ing to ensure the integrity of digital works used for investigations. This can also be 
applied to any digital work that is distributed on the Internet. 
2.5 Broadcast Monitoring 
Broadcast television and radio have become big business in recent years. It is esti-
mated that television broadcasts by companies such as Reuters, CNN, and the Associ-
ated Press have a value of over X100,000 per hour [11]. Currently there is no efficient 
way to track distribution of a broadcast or to verify its delivery. Watermarking has been 
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proposed to protect the distribution of these broadcasts. By embedding a watermark 
into a digital broadcast, companies hope to solve distribution problems presented by 
broadcasting. 
One problem that broadcast monitoring looks to solve is verifying the delivery of 
broadcasts. In 1997, it was reported that for over 20 years several major television 
stations in Japan had been overbooking advertising air time, thus selling advertising 
they did not in fact deliver [12] . This had gone undetected mainly because there is no 
way to ensure that advertisements are successfully sent to consumers. 
A simple way to do broadcast monitoring is to have human observers watch the 
broadcast and record what they see [4] . However, this method is inefficient and highly 
un-scalable. Watermarking, on the other hand, has been proposed to solve these prob-
lems in an efficient manner. Watermarking algorithms such as JAWS, Just Another 
Watermarking System, have been introduced with the specific goal of broadcast moni-
toring [11] . By inserting imperceptible data into a broadcast, companies will be able to 
easily monitor what is ~ being broadcast, or more importantly, what is not being broad-
cast.. 
An example implementation of this would be if each consumer has aset-top box that 
is able to detect the watermark in a broadcast. This box can keep statistics about what 
was watched and what was not watched in an efficient manner. These data can then be 
sent back to the broadcaster for processing. 
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CHAPTER 3. Watermarking Principles, Properties and 
Attacks 
This chapter explores previous watermarking work for the purpose of defining digital 
watermarking. First, the basic idea behind watermarking will be explored with the 
desired properties of a watermark. Known attacks will then be explored along with an 
explanation of how to measure the success or failure of these attacks. 
3.1 Basics of Digital Watermarking 
While there have been many different watermarking techniques proposed, most follow 
the same basic algorithm. Figure 3.1 shows the steps followed to embed and detect a 
watermark. 
watermark 
Original Data 
Similarity 
Measure 
Transform/Filter 
(Optional) 
(Optional) 
Extracted 
W atermazk 
Inverse 
Transform/Filter 
(Optional) 
Extractor 
Embeddor 
Key 
/ (Optional) 
Transform/Filter 
(Optional) 
Figure 3.1 Basic watermarking process 
Watermazked Data 
Attacks/Noisy Channel 
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3.1.1 Embedding the Watermark 
The first step is data manipulation. This manipulation, which is optional, can take 
many forms. Researchers have proposed spatial transforms such as separation into 
bit planes and filters along with domain transforms such as the discrete cosine trans-
form (DCT), the discrete wavelet transform (DWT), and the discrete Fourier ~ansform 
(DFT) [15, 3, 22]. Other data manipulation techniques, such as region filtering to find 
regions of interest, have also been proposed. [2, 24] 
Once the data have been manipulated so that they are in the correct forms, the 
watermark is then added to the manipulated data. The basic equation is outlined in 
Equation 3.1. 
X * is the watermarked data ,Xis the original work and W is the watermark. 
An optional key may be used in some embedding algorithms. The use of an optional 
ma var in different schemes. Exam le uses include a seudo random number key y y p p 
generator seed or coordinates that point to specific locations where the watermark is 
inserted [7, 20] . If necessary, the data are manipulated back to a form which can be 
physically viewed or listened to by a user. 
3.1.2 Detecting the Watermark 
Once the watermark has been embedded it must be detectable in order to be useful. 
It should be noted that once a watermark has been embedded, it is susceptible to attacks 
or bit errors that are the result of a noisy channel. The detector must be able to extract 
the watermark despite any attacks or bit errors. 
Detection can be separated into two categories, blind and non-blind detection. Non-
blind detection is when the watermark is detected using the original digital work whereas 
blind detection is when the watermark is detected without using the original digital work 
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to extract the watemark. Blind detection can be called a public watermarking system 
and non-blind detection can be called a private watermarking system [4] . The use of 
these two detection schemes depends on the watermarking application. 
Once the watermark is extracted it must be evaluated to be useful. This evaluation 
may be a simple decoding of the watermark to get a message or it may be a similar-
ity measure with the original watermark. Decoding a watermark is a straightforward 
process using the decoding technique. However, evaluation of the comparison can be 
complex. The way in which this comparision is done varies in different schemes. What-
ever scheme is used, there must be some sort of error-rate or similarity level achieved. 
This measure is then compared to a predetermined threshold that indicates the presence 
of the watermark in a binary yes or no sense. "Yes" means the watermark is present 
and " No " means the watermark is not present [9] . 
Determining this threshold level is a difficult subject that has troubled researchers . 
The threshold must be set so that it minimizes either false negatives or false positives or 
both. False positive errors occur when a detector indicates the presence of a watermark 
in unwatermarked work and false negative errors occur when a detector fails to detect a 
watermark in a watermarked work [4] . Cox et al. sums up two basic ways in which these 
error threshold levels can be created for both false postive and false negative errors. 
One way. to test the system is against random watermarks. Cox et al. pointed out 
that although this type of modeling is less useful, it is often used because of its simplicity 
[4] . This type of test looks at the probability of being able to detect a random watermark 
in a watermarked medium. This type of probability is much easier to compute since the 
watermark distribution is controlled by the watermarking scheme. This type of test is 
useful when a Large number of watermarks will be inserted into a small number of works. 
An example of this application would be transaction tracking. 
Another way is testing a watermark against random works. Since there are an infinite 
number of works and the distribution of this is not under the control of the user, this type 
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of probability is very hard to compute. Most researchers have limited their examination 
to random watermark probabilities because of this fact. This type of test is applicable 
to copy control applications since a few watermarks would be put into a large number 
of works. 
This paper will use random watermark probabilities when computing threshold levels. 
Despite the limitations of these probabilities, they are much easier to compute and 
subsequently have been used in most of the literature on watermarking when creating 
threshold levels. 
3.2 Digital Watermarking Properties 
For a watermarking scheme to be successful it must be secure. For purposes of 
analysis, the concept of security can be defined in terms of three different properties 
that a secure watermark will possess. A secure watermark is unobtrusive, robust and 
unambigious. It should be noted that each application of a watermarking scheme will 
place a different weight on each security requirement to achieve its security goal. 
3.2.1 Unobtrusive 
The property of unobtrusiveness is important to watermarks and is a vital quality 
in most watermark applications. Unobtrusiveness means that the watermark should be 
perceptually invisible. [3J Another term used to describe this is fidelity, which refers to the 
similarity of the watermarked work to the original work [4]. In most cases it is desirable 
to have the watermarked work be similar to the original version. This paper will focus 
on the fidelity of the watermarked work in comparison to the attacked watermarked 
work. 
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3.2.2 Robustness 
Robustness refers to the ability of the watermarked work to resist attack. A wa-
termarking scheme must be able to extract the watermark despite an attack. Attacks, 
which will be explored in a subsequent section, can be intentional or unintentional. 
Watermarking schemes need not be robust to all attacks but rather robust to specific 
attacks that would hinder the overall application of the watermarking scheme [4]. 
3.2.3 Unambigious 
The watermark should be able to be retrieved unambiguously by the watermarker [3] . 
This means that the detection should be able to show with certainty that a watermark 
is within a work. A 100 percent detection rate is obviously desired. However, this is 
very hard, if not impossible, to achieve especially in the face of attacks. It is therefore 
desirable to create a scheme that has a high probability of detection. These probabilities 
can be very hard to compute. This idea will be explored later in this paper. 
3.3 Attacks on Watermarks 
There are three basic ways to defeat a watermarking system. These ways as defined 
by Cox et al. are unauthorized embedding, unauthorized detection and unauthorized 
removal [4J . 
3.3.1 Embedding Attacks 
Embedding attacks involve a malicious user embedding a watermark into a work. If 
a malicious user is able to embed his or her own or someone else's watermark then he 
or she may be able to thwart the original use of the watermark. 
Craver et al. have explored a form of an embedding attack known as an ambiguity 
attack [5~. They argue that a watermarking scheme must be non-invertible and non-
15 
Alice's Watermark 
Original Image 
Watermark Embeddor 
Bob's Fake Original Watermark Extractor 
Image 
Watemarked Image 
Bob's Watermark 
Figure 3.2 Craver et al. ambiguous attack process. 
quasi-invertible to be successful in providing rightful ownership. This attack is as follows: 
Suppose Alice watermarks her photo before releasing it to the public. Bob, again, wants 
to use the photo and to claim the photo as his own. If the watermarking scheme is 
invertible then Bob is able to extract a watermark and create a fake original. He can 
then claim that he owns the original because his watermark is contained in Alice's 
original and watermarked image. This process is shown in Figure 3.2 [5~. This idea 
presented by Craver et al. is an important one when considering proof of ownership. 
If watermarking is to be used in this type of application it must be certain that the 
algorithm used satisfies the property of being non-invertible and non-quasi-invertible. 
Another form of an embedding attack is the copy attack [14] . This attack looks to 
estimate the watermark from a watermarked work. Once the watermark has been esti-
mated it can be inserted into different works. This attack presents a form of an identity 
attack. If a watermark is used to identify someone and a malicious user has access to 
this watermark then it may be embedded in order to wrongfully identify someone. This 
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type of attack could have very serious consequences. Again a watermarking scheme must 
be resistant to this attack to be commercially viable. 
3.3.2 Detection Attacks 
Detection attacks are applicable to situations when a user should not be able to 
detect the presence of a watermark. If a malicious user is able to detect the watermark, 
he or she may be able to use it in a way that is contrary to the application of the 
watermark. This type of attack is geared more towards stegonography but can also be 
applied to watermarks. If a watermark contains information that should be hidden from 
the user then the user should not be able to detect the watermark. 
An example of this would be if a hospital embedded a patient's name and information 
into an X-ray [4]. In this case the hospital wants only authorized users to be able to 
detect the watermark to protect the privacy of the patient. If a malicious user is able to 
extract the watermark then the watermark scheme is defeated in this application. 
3.3.3 Removal Attacks 
Removal attacks look to alter the watermarked work in such a way that the wa-
termark cannot be detected by the watermark scheme detector. This has been a very 
popular attack and has received significant attention from researchers. These attacks 
include intentional and unintentional attacks [4] . 
Stirmark is a tool that tests image watermarking schemes against many different 
removal attacks [17] . Stirmark performs a number of different attacks on a watermarked 
image which attempts to disrupt the watermark detection. Table 3.1 shows the attacks 
performed by Stirmark, their classification, and their intention. 
The two types of attacks executed by Stirmark are geometric and signal processing. 
Many of the geometric attacks can also be called synchronization attacks. Synchroniza-
tion attacks try to de-synchronize the work from the detector. One thing to note is that 
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Table 3.1 Attacks included in Stirmark 3.1. 
Attack Classification Intention 
Cropping 
Flip 
Rotation 
Rotation-Scale 
Random bending 
Linear transformations 
Aspect ratio 
Scale changes 
Line removal 
FMLR, sharpening, Gaussian filtering 
Color reduction 
JPEG compression 
Geometric 
Geometric 
Geometric 
Geometric 
Geometric 
Geometric 
Geometric 
Geometric 
Geometric 
Signal Processing 
Signal Processing 
Signal Processing 
Intentional 
Intentional 
Intentional 
Intentional 
Intentional 
Intentional 
Unintentional 
Unintentional 
Intentional 
Intentional 
Intentional 
Unintentional 
in most cases the watermark is still present and intact within the digital work. However, 
it cannot be detected due to de-synchronization. These attacks can quite often be over-
come by increasing the complexity of the detection algorithm. However, the allowable 
complexity of the detection algorithm is application dependent (8]. 
Statistical attacks are another form of removal attack. These attacks attempt to 
analyze or combine the digital work data in such a way so as to remove the watermark 
[6J. This attack looks to analyze the data statistically such that the attack is able to 
create a watermark free digital work. The collusion attack, which will be explored in a 
subsequent section, is the main type of attack that falls under this category. 
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CHAPTER 4. Digital Video Watermarking 
.This chapter explores the specifics of digital video watermarking. The algorithms 
used for testing in this paper will be presented in addition to an exploration of attacks 
specifically designed for digital video watermarks. The algorithms presented here are 
not fully representative of all existing watermarking algorithms. The recent interest 
in digital watermarking has produced a large number of digital video watermarking 
algorithms. Instead of an exhaustive explanation of every watermarking algorithm, this 
paper will focus on two prominent watermarking algorithms. 
Throughout this paper it is assumed that all video is in an uncompressed format. 
Uncompressed video is used rather than compressed video because of ever changing com-
pression standards. Compression standards are constantly being updated and changed. 
Standards such as mpegl, mpeg2, mpeg4,mpeg7, AVI and MOV have all been released 
fairly. recently. For this reason it is desirable to study uncompressed video since this will 
be a constant compared to changing compression standards over time. 
4.1 Watermarking Schemes 
4.1.1 Frequency Domain Spread Spectrum Watermarking 
Spread spectrum watermarking was one of the first schemes presented for digital wa-
termarking. It is a non-blind watermarking scheme that works in the transform domain. 
It utilizes communication technology concepts and applies them towards watermarking. 
This scheme works in the frequency domain and thus will be referred to as a frequency 
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domain watermarking scheme throughout this paper. 
Spread spectrum watermarking is a relatively simple technique that embeds data 
into works using spread spectrum technology. Traditionally spread spectrum is used in 
communication technology where a narrowband signal is transmitted over a much larger 
bandwidth such that the signal energy in any given frequency is undetectable [3]. In 
other words, such a small signal is inserted that this is considered to be part of the noise 
of the signal and is therefore undetectable unless there is a knowledge of where these 
signals were inserted. 
4.1.1.1 Embedding the Watermark 
The first step in inserting the watermark into video is grabbing the individual pixel 
values. For a black and white image these are integer values ranging from 0 to 255. 
The next step is to transform the image into the frequency domain. Cox et al. achieve 
this by using the discrete cosine transform (DCT). This can be accomplished by using 
Equation 4.1 [19]. 
F(u) = 2c(u) ~ f~m) cos 
~2m + 1)u~r 
N ,~=0 2N 
where u = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N — 1 
where (4.1) 
c(u) = 2 for u = 0 
(u) = 1, for u = 0, 1, 2, 3, . .. , N 
This is aone-dimensional equation and in order to apply it to atwo-dimensional 
image it must be applied twice. It first is applied to the rows and then to the columns. 
One thing to note is that the DCT is applied to the whole image at once. 
Once the image is transformed into the frequency domain the watermark is then 
inserted. The first step is to create the watermark. The watermark consists of a vector 
of n random real numbers that have a Gaussian distribution of N[O,1J, a mean of 0 and 
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a variance of 1 [3] . The top n values are then extracted from the frequency transformed 
domain to get Vn. This is achieved by doing azig-zag scan of -the top left-most values in 
the DCT matrix, excluding the DC coefficient. The zig-zag scan is similar to that done 
in JPEG compression. 
Once this is done a vector Vn is obtained consisting of the top n values of the frequency 
domain transformed image and a watermark vector Xn consisting of n random real 
numbers that have a Gaussian distribution. The watermark is then inserted by using 
one of the following equations: 
V' = V -I- c~X2
V' = V (eaX2) 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
In the above equations V' is the watermarked vector and cx is the scale. The scale 
can be set to be whatever the user desires with a tradeoff between unobtrusiveness and 
robustness. Cox et al. suggest using cx = 0.1. Once this has been done to each of the 
n elements in Vn, the watermarked vector is reinserted into the image. The image is 
transformed out of the frequency domain by performing the inverse DCT. Once this 
is done, the image is watermarked. An example of an image watermarked using this 
technique can be seen in Figure 4.1. 
4.1.1.2 Detecting the Watermark 
Once the image is watermarked, the watermark can be extracted in order to prove 
that the watermark is contained within the image file. In order to do this, the original 
image, the watermarked image, and the scale factor are needed. Again, the first step 
is to transform both the original and watermarked image into the frequency domain 
by performing the DCT on each image. Next, the watermark is extracted by using 
one of the three equations above and solving for Xi . For example, if the equation 
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(a) Original image (b) 1 Watermarked image 
Figure 4.1 Frequency domain watermarked image 
V' = V (1 + cxXi) were used to watermark the image then to extract the watermark the 
equation, Xi = (V'/V — 1)/a, where Xz is the extracted watermark is used. 
It is then necessary to compare the extracted vector X* with the original watermark 
vector X. This is done using the following equation: 
* 
~/X* •X* 
Using this similarity test gives a confidence number that shows the probability that 
the watermark extracted is the same as the original watermark. The confidence level 
should be roughly ~ [3] . This, however, may vary due to quantization when the image 
is transformed back to the spatial domain. 
A random watermark false probability test can be used to find the probability of 
false positives in order to measure the effectiveness of the scheme. It is expected that 
the extracted watermark has a distribution of N [0, 1] . Therefore, the expected variance 
of the extracted watermark should be ~ 1 Xi a = X * • X * = 1 and thus the extracted 
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Figure 4.2 Graph of similarity measure for frequency domain watermark-
ingwhen the extracted watermark is compared to 999 random 
watermarks and the 1 original watermark. 
watermark would have the expected distribution of N[0, X * • X *] . If the threshold is set 
to T, then the probability of Sim(X, X *) > T is the probability of X * • X * exceeding its 
expected mean by more than T deviations [3] . The central limit theorem tells us that 
the probability of this can be found using the Equation 4.6 citepprob. 
00 1 t2 
~ (T) =  e-  2 dt 
T 2~r 
(4.6) 
For example, if T = 3 then the probability of Sim(X, X*) > 3 is ~(3) = 0.0013. 
This means that there is an approximate probability of 1 in 1000 that there will be a 
random watermark with a Sim(X, X*) > 3. Figure 4.2 shows a simulation of this. The 
original watermark is compared with 999 random watermarks. .Note that several random 
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watermarks have similarity measures greater than 3. 
4.1.2 Spatial Domain Spread Spectrum Watermarking 
Hartung and Girod have proposed an alternative spread spectrum watermarking 
scheme. This algorithm has several distinct differences from the previous method. First, 
it works in the spatial domain and thus will be referred to as the spatial domain water-
marking scheme. No transform is made so the watermark is added directly to individual 
pixel values. Also, the watermark added to each frame is not the same. The watermark 
is multiplied by pseudo-noise sequence in order to achieve this non-consistent property. 
4.1.2.1 Embedding the Watermark 
First, the video is line scanned in order to achieve a single vector of signal data [7]. 
This is achieved by doing a scan of the first line width wise followed by appending the 
next line to the first line. This process is outlined in Figure 4.3 [7] . 
M Pixels 
v 
M*N 
Vo V 1 V2 VN-1 
~v M*N - 1 
.~ 
N Pixels 
Time 
Figure 4.3 Line scan of video 
The watermark is a bi-polar set of bits defined by equation 4.7 [7]. 
a~, a~ E {-1,1}, j E N (4.7) 
24 
Binary data can be .used by simply converting a 0 to a —1. This sequence of water-
mark bits is what is inserted into the video. The signal is then spread by a factor called 
the chip rate denoted by cr. The chip rate is combined with tl~e watermark sequence as
defined in Equation 4.8 [7]. 
bi =a~, j•cr<i<(j+l)•cr, iEN (4.8) 
The cr spreads the signal watermark bit over a number of pixels in order to achieve 
robustness by means of redundancy [7]. This sequence is then multiplied by an amplitude 
factor a > 0 and a pseudo random noise sequence pi. The amplitude factor can be 
adjusted to different levels. A trade-off between fidelity and robustness must be measured 
to achieve the right number for a. The higher a is, the lower the fidelity and the higher 
the robustness and vice versa. The pseudo random noise sequence or psrn is a bi-polar 
vector of bits that equals the length of the signal vector v~. The watermark is then added 
to the original signal by using the Equation 4.9 (7]. 
~i =vi-~(xi 'b2 'pi~ i E N (4.9) 
The result vi is then put back into the original video three-dimensional form and the 
watermark insertion is complete. Figure 4.4 shows an example of a watermarked frame. 
4.1.2.2 Detecting the Watermark 
The watermark may then be retrieved by using a blind or non-blind method. The 
blind method involves using a filter to separate the watermark from the video. The 
authors, Hartung and Girod, suggest using a 3x3 high pass filter. The non-blind method 
simply subtracts the original signal from the watermark signal in order to extract the 
watermark. Once the signal has been filtered, either by the original video or some other 
method, the original watermark bits are then calculated using Equation 4.10. 
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(a) Original frame 
(b) Watermarked frame 
Figure 4.4 Spatial domain watermarked frame. 
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(j-~-1)•cr-1 
sign(s~) =sign( ~ p? • ai • bi) = a~ (4.10) 
2=j •cr 
Once again the random watermark false probability test is used to find the probability 
of false positives. Assuming the watermarks are random, each ®comparison in Equation 
4.11 has a 50 percent chance of being a 1 when the bits are different and 50% chance 
of being a 0 when the bits are the same, so one would expect ~ 1(xi ®xz) ~ 2 with 
a variance of 4. Using the central limit theorem we can obtain Equation 4.11 which is 
used as the similarity measure. 
n * n 
~i_1(xi ®xi — 2 
n 
4 
Under perfect circumstances and using the more reliable non-blind detection there 
should be no bit errors, which gives a similarity measure of ~. However, due to 
quantization or attacks or both this number will vary. Therefore, it is beneficial to 
use a random watermark false positive analysis to determine the probability of different. 
thresholds. In other words, the probability of the extracted watermark and a random 
watermark having a certain similarity level is computed. 
Again this similarity rate can be plugged into Equation 4.6. For example suppose n = 
900 and Sim (X , X *) = 3 which means that 405 out of the 900 bits were different . Using 
Equation 4.6 gives the probability of a random watermark having a Sim (X, X *) > 3. 
This is found to be 0.0013. Again, this means that there is an approximate probability 
of 1 in 1000 that there will be a random watermark with a Sim(X, X *) > 3. 
Figure 4.5 shows a simulation of the random watermark false positive probability test. 
The similarity rate of an extracted watermark is compared to 999 random watermarks 
and the original watermark. Note that the original watermark clearly stands out above 
the rest with aSim = 30 and at least one random watermark is greater than 3. 
(4.11) 
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when the extracted watermark is compared to 999 random wa-
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4.2 Digital Video Watermarking Attacks 
As mentioned before, the temporal dimension leaves video watermarking prone to 
collusion attacks. A collusion attack is when frames of video are analyzed or combined 
in order to produce a digital work which is free from a watermark [20~. Video contains 
redundancy between frames since quite often very little changes from frame to frame. 
Collusion exploits these redundancies in an effort to remove the watermark from the 
work. Collusion attacks can further be classified into two different categories. 
Type 1 collusion attacks exploits temporal redundancy in the watermark [6]. This 
type of collusion takes visually dissimilar video frames marked with the same watermark 
and attempts to recreate the watermark [20~. If the watermark can be recreated it can 
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then simply be subtracted from frames in order to remove the watermark. 
An example of Type 1 collusion is using a filter to extract a watermark from each 
frame and then averaging the extracted watermarks. Anisotropic diffusion is a one 
example of a noise filter that can be used to separate the watermark from the image 
[23]. Using a filter like this might produce a good estimation of the watermark, but since 
there is more than one watermark extracted these can be averaged to gain an even more 
accurate estimation of the original watermark. 
Type 2 collusion attacks exploits temporal redundancy in the video frames [6J. This 
type of collusion takes visually similar frames marked with a different watermark and 
attempts to remove the watermark by replacing watermarked data with watermark free 
or different watermarked data [21~. 
An example of a Type 2 collusion attack is frame averaging. This attack averages 
visually similar frames in an attempt to create a watermark free frame. This attack is 
outlined in equation 4.12. 
X i t= 1  t LX i ~~ di 4.12 
L ,~=t 
t is the frame number, L is a the number of frames to average, i and j represent pixel 
locations and X (i, j, t) represents the frame to be replaced. This attack arithmetically 
averages pixel values over a certain number of frames to replace a single frame. This 
attack can be effective in removing a watermark. However, this attack is sensitive to 
movement between frames. Most video contains some movement from frame to frame. 
This attack can severely affect the fidelity of the digital work, especially when there is 
a lot of movement between frames as shown in Figure 4.6 
Current Type 2 collusion attacks can be successful at removing the watermark but 
this is often at the expense of fidelity, especially in high movement video. 
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CHAPTER 5. Attack Methodology 
T.he replacement attack was first proposed by Kirovski and Petitcolas [13~. Their 
2002 paper outlines a method for exploiting temporal redundancy in watermarked works. 
They mention that this attack can be applied to video, but the attack is only applied 
to audio in the paper. This leaves unanswered questions as to how this attack can be 
applied to digital video. This chapter explores the replacement attack as applied to 
digital video watermarks. Two algorithms were created to implement an attack based 
on the replacement strategy. The algorithms are fully presented as well as an example 
watermarking scenario in which the attack would be effective. 
This attack looks to remove the video watermark by separating each frame into 
smaller blocks and then replacing these blocks with perceptually similar blocks found 
within the same frame and temporally close frames. This attack is a Type 2 collusion 
removal attack. The goal of this attack is to create a watermark free- copy of a digital 
video while preserving the fidelity of the digital video. 
Variables for equations used in this attack are defined in Table 5.1. 
5.1 The Replacement Algorithm 
The first step in the replacement algorithm is to separate the digital work into smaller 
blocks. There are two types of block separation. The first separation is the replacement 
blocks. These blocks are non-overlapping blocks that are to be replaced by perceptually 
similar blocks. The number of blocks are found by Equation 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Variable definitions 
Variable Meaning 
N Frame Width 
M dame Height 
F Number of FYames 
m Size of Blocks 
r~ Crossover 
k Number of Search Blocks 
n Number of Replacement Blocks 
,6 Maximum Threshold 
a Minimum Threshold 
The other type of blocks are search blocks. The difference between search blocks and 
replacement blocks is the crossover, r~. The size of ~ determines the number of search 
blocks. Using a smaller value for ~ will create a large number of search blocks and larger 
values for ~ will create a smaller number of search blocks. Equation 5.2 determines the 
number of search blocks, I~. Figure 5.1 shows a visual representation of separation into 
search blocks. It is hoped that an increase in 1~ will increase the probability of finding a 
replacement for the replacement blocks. 
k —M F~ N—m +ll 
~! / 
(5.2) 
Once the replacement and search blocks have been formed, the blocks must then be 
compared. This is done using the root mean square error or rmse equation shown in 
Equation 5.3. 
m(B., aJ = 1
1 "~- i 
— ~[Br1 21 '{- l~~l~tl~ — Bs122'~ 1~~2~t2~~2 
m t=o 
(5.3) 
The value obtained by ~(Bl , BZ ) is then compared to the threshold levels a and ,Q 
using equation 5.4. 
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Table 5.2 Replacement algorithm 
Input Variable Description 
Original Video 
m 
a 
This is the. watermarked video to be attacked 
blocksize 
Maximum Threshold 
Minimum Threshold 
crossover value 
Output Description 
Watermarked Video The attacked Video 
Replacement Count The number of blocks replaced 
Algorithm 
1. Set Variables 
rn =number of replacement blocks in movie using equation 5.1 
sn =number of search blocks in movie using equation 5.2 
2. For every replacement block 
For every search block 
rmse(current replacement block, current search block) use equation 5.3 
if (rmse > a and rmse < ,6 ) 
replace current replacement block with current search block 
Keep replacement block if no suitable search block is found 
3. Write attacked video to file 
Note 
The first suitable search block is used for replacement. Each search block may be 
used an infinite number of times for replacement. 
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.Figure 5.1 Search block separation process 
If the rmse is between the threshold values then the search block is suitable for 
replacement. a is used to preserve fidelity and ,Q is used so that the block is not too 
similar to the original. 
This process is repeated for every replacement block. If a suitable block is not found 
for replacement, then the original block is kept to preserve fidelity. 
5.2 Swap Algorithm 
The steps in the swap algorithm are similar to the replacement algorithm but there 
are some key differences. Again the first step is to separate the video into blocks. 
However, in this algorithm Equation 5.1 is used for both the replacement and search 
blocks so that the number of search and replacement blocks are the same. 
The replacement blocks are compared to each of the search blocks. If the rmse falls 
between the threshold levels then instead of just replacing the replacement block, the 
blocks are swapped such that the replacement block is put in the place of the search 
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Table 5.3 Swap algorithm 
Input Variable Description 
Original Video 
m 
Q 
a 
This is the watermarked video to be attacked 
blocksize 
Maximum Threshold 
Minimum Threshold 
Output Description 
Watermarked Video The attacked Video 
Replacement Count The number of blocks replaced 
Algorithm 
1. Set Variables 
r =number of replacement and search blocks blocks in movie using equation 5.1 
2. For every replacement block 
For every search block 
rmse(current replacement block, current search block) use equation 5.3 
if (rmse > a and rmse < ,6 ) 
swap the replacement and search block 
record the block numbers so that they are not swapped again 
Keep replacement block if no suitable search block is found 
3. Write attacked video to file 
Note 
The algorithm is ran such that suitable search blocks are searched for within 
the current frame and subsequent frames. 
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block and search block is put in the place of the replacement block. Once two blocks 
have been swapped they may not be swapped again. 
5.3 Attack Scenario 
A transaction tracking digital video watermarking application scenario is established 
for the sake of analysis as described below. This scenario is used to set the threshold, T, 
that indicates the success or failure of an attack. Note that this is not the only scenario 
in which the attack would be applicable. However, this scenario best fits the random 
watermark false positive error analysis performed in sections 4.1.1.2 and 4.1.2.2. 
Suppose that Alice owns a streaming video service that allows users to stream movies 
over the Internet to their computers. Alice uses two forms of protection to protect 
the videos from being illegally copied and distributed. First, the videos are encrypted 
before they are streamed. The application to play the streaming videos is exclusively 
distributed by Alice's company so that Alice's application is the only application that is 
able to decode and play the video. The encryption is used to protect the content while 
in transit and while resident on the user's machine such that a user would not be able 
to save the downstream to a physical media and play it on anon-compliant player or 
program, such as a commercial DVD player or Windows Media Player. 
If only encryption is used, the service is still vulnerable to an attack that simply copies 
the digital work after it has been decrypted.. This can be accomplished by grabbing the 
audio and video after it is decrypted and before it is sent to the sound card and video 
card. Therefore an additional level of protection is needed. Alice's company decides to 
use watermarking for the extra layer of protection. 
Each video player application provided by Alice's company has a unique watermark 
that identifies the user to the streaming provider. When a user desires to watch a movie 
the application sends a request to Alice's video server along with the unique watermark in 
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order to authenticate the user to the server. Alice's server embeds the unique watermark 
into the video as it is streamed to the user. A recording application may still be used 
to record the movie, but the recorded video will contain the unique- watermark that can 
be linked back to the original user. 
Alice has about one million customers and each customer has a unique watermark. 
Thus, when an illegally recorded video is found distributed on the Internet it is checked 
against a database of one million watermarks to find the origin of distribution. Therefore, 
Alice uses a random watermark false probability test to set the threshold to be used. 
A threshold of T = 5.5 is found to have a false positive probability of 1.89 x 10_g 
using Equation 4.6. If a similarity rate comes up that is above the threshold then the 
adversary is most certainly identified. Using this threshold gives a very small probability 
of having a false positive when comparing with one million watermarks. The probability 
is approximately one in 50 million. 
Bob is a user of Alice's service. He wants to record the decrypted video and illegally 
distribute it on the Internet. He knows that a watermarking scheme is used to deter users 
from doing this. He also knows that if he distributes a watermarked copy of the video 
it can be traced back to him. Bob also has knowledge of the watermarking scheme and 
the threshold used. Therefore, Bob wants to find a way to remove the watermark such 
that if Alice's company tests the attacked video against Bob's watermark the similarity 
rate will be less than 5.5. 
This logic and scenario is used to analyze the results of the attacks performed on the 
two different digital video watermarking schemes. The attacks will be deemed successful 
if a similarity measure that is less than 5.5 is achieved and the video has a suitable level 
of fidelity. 
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CHAPTER 6. Results 
Simulations were performed using a high movement 5 frame 352 x 512 video sequence 
taken from a commercially available DVD, Mission Impossible II. The original sequence 
is in true color so it was converted to black and white by separating the frames into hue, 
saturation and luminance layers with just the luminance layer retained. The video file 
type used was Audio Video Interlaced (AVI) , using no compression. 
For the frequency domain watermarking scheme outlined in 4.1.1 the variables are 
set ton = 1024 and a = 0.1. Equation 4.3 is used for insertion. The similarity measure 
is taken for each frame and arithmetically averaged to get the overall similarity measure 
of the video. 
For the spatial domain watermarking outlined in 4.1.2, the variables are set to cr = 
1000, n = 901 and ~ = 4. The watermark extraction uses anon-blind method to get a 
more accurately extracted watermark. 
For the replacement and swap algorithms variable values m = 8,16, 32, 64,128, 256 & 512, 
~x = 3 and ,~ = 10 were used. The parameter ~ = r"' was used in all replacement simu-
lations. 
6.1 Frequency Domain Spread Spectrum Watermarking 
Results 
The results of both the replacement and swap algorithms applied to the frequency 
domain watermarked video are graphically depicted in Figure 6.1. Using the logic out-
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Figure 6.1 Graph of similarity measures for frequency domain watermark-
ing when attacked with different values of m. 
lined in section 5.3, a successful watermark extraction threshold is set to T = 5.5. For 
the replacement algorithm, m > 32 shows a successful attack. For the swap algorithm, 
m ti 128 shows a successful attack. Overall, the replacement algorithm produces a 
smaller sim rate than the swap algorithm. 
The rate of replacement is also compared. These results are shown in Figure 6.2. As 
expected, the replacement algorithm has an overall higher rate of replacement compared 
to the swap algorithm. 
Overall, the swap algorithm produces a higher fidelity video than the replacement 
algorithm. Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show the first frame of attacked videos. Figure 
6.3 shows frames attacked when m = 128. At this block size both algorithms were able 
to remove the watermark. The replacement algorithm shows obvious lines where the 
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Figure 6.2 Graph of replacement percentages for frequency domain water-
marking when attacked with different values of m. 
blocks were replaced, whereas the swap algorithm shows fewer visual lines. Figure 6.4 
shows frames attacked when m = 512. At this block size only the replacement algorithm 
was successful in removing the watermark. This block size proved to have the highest 
fidelity for the replacement algorithm. However, lines are still visible and the fidelity of 
the video is significantly decreased. 
6.2 Spatial Domain Spread Spectrum Watermarking Results 
The results of both the replacement and swap algorithms applied to the spatial 
domain watermarked video are graphically depicted in Figure 6.5. This watermarking 
scheme is more resistent to the attack than the frequency domain scheme. No value 
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(a) Replacement algorithm 
(b) Swap algorithm 
Figure 6.3 This figure compares the 2 frames that have been watermarked 
using the frequency domain watermarking scheme and attacked 
using the replacement and swap algorithms using m = 128. 
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(a) Replacement algorithm 
(b) Swap algorithm 
Figure 6.4 This figure compares the 2 frames that have been watermarked 
using the frequency domain watermarking scheme and attacked 
using the replacement and swap algorithms using m = 512. 
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Figure 6.5 Graph of similarity measures for spatial domain watermarking 
when attacked with different values of m. 
of m was found in this simulation to create a similarity measure < 5.5 despite a high 
percentage of replacement, as shown in Figure 6.6. 
Figure 6.7 shows the first frame of the attacked video with m = 512. Again, the 
fidelity is better using the swap algorithm. 
6.3 Discussion of Results 
Both the replacement and the swap algorithm succeeded in removing the frequency 
domain watermark. However, neither algorithms were successful in removing the spatial 
domain watermark. 
Both algorithms removed the watermark from the frequency domain scheme but 
the swap algorithm was able to produce a higher fidelity video sequence. By use of a 
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Figure 6.6 Graph of replacement percentages for spatial domain water-
marking when attacked with different values of m. 
blocksize of m ti 128 it was possible to remove a frequency domain watermark such that 
the similarity measure was below the threshold and the fidelity of this attacked video 
was also acceptable. The video was noticeably fuzzy, but it was definitely watchable. 
Overall, the swap algorithm was a more successful attack because it was able to satisfy 
both attack requirements. 
Neither the replacement algorithm nor the swap algorithm were able to remove the 
watermark from the spatial domain video watermarking scheme such that the similarity 
measure was below the threshold. The main reason for this difference is believed to be 
the redundancy built into the spatial domain watermarking scheme via the chip rate. 
Even though the similarity measures did not go below the threshold, at some block sizes, 
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(a) Replacement algorithm 
(b) Swap algorithm 
Figure 6.7 This figure compares the 2 frames that have been watermarked 
using the spatial domain watermarking scheme and attacked us-
ing the replacement and swap algorithms using m = 512. 
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the attack was able to signicantly decrease similarity measures such that they are very 
close to the threshold. Further efforts to optimize the attack variables would possibly 
increase the bit error rate and produce a successful attack. It should also be noted 
that the example threshold set is not set in stone. Another application of watermarking 
might set a different higher threshold. 
Each of the attack algorithms has advantages and disadvantages. As expected, a 
larger search space increased the probability of finding a suitable replacement in the 
replacement algorithm. However, the fidelity of the attacked frames was lower using the 
replacement algorithm. This is believed to be because search blocks could be used to 
replace more than one replacement block. When a single search block is similar to a 
high number of replacement blocks, it is used for replacement a high number of times. 
This adversely affects the randomness of the image data in the frames and causes lines 
to appear where blocks were replaced. 
Overall, the results show that the spatial domain watermarking scheme ~ is more re-
silient than the frequency domain watermarking scheme and the most effective algorithm 
is the swap algorithm. These results are far from a complete exploration of this attack on 
video watermarking schemes but the data contributed in this paper is sufficient for some 
general conclusions. First, it appears that the collusion attack based on the replacement 
strategy as applied to video is a significant attack that compromises the security of video 
watermarking schemes. The success of the attack calls into question whether such video 
watermarking schemes can be commercially used. Also, it appears that redundancy is 
a very important property that a digital video watermarking scheme must possess. The 
frequency domain scheme does not use redundancy and thus is susceptible to this attack. 
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CHAPTER 7. Conclusion 
This paper introduces two collusion attack algorithms based on the replacement 
strategy and performed a simulation of the attack against two different watermarking 
schemes. The attack was shown to be an effective attack on one of the watermarking 
schemes while the other watermarking scheme was found to be resistant to the attack. 
The results of the simulations lead to several conclusions. First, it seems clear that 
the video watermarking schemes examined are vulnerable to this attack. The attack 
was able to significantly reduce similarity rates of both watermarking schemes. As a 
result of this, digital watermarking schemes for video must be improved with this attack 
in mind if they are to be successful. Lessons can also be learned by exploring why the 
spatial domain scheme was more resilient than the frequency domain scheme. One of the 
major differences between the schemes is the redundancy built into the spatial domain 
scheme. Using the chip rate to spread each bit across many pixels significantly increased 
the resilience of the scheme. These simulations show that redundancy is a vital property 
of video watermarking schemes. 
Overall, this paper's contributions are twofold. It adds to the knowledge base of 
known successful attacks and also highlights properties of video watermarking schemes 
that make them resilient to the attack. This knowledge should be taken into considera-
tion when creating future watermarking schemes. 
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7.1 Future Work 
The work performed here has suggested the following future work may be appropriate. 
• Testing using different values for variables. The variable values used for 
testing were not known to be the optimal variables for the attack. Further testing 
would be beneficial to find optimal thresholds for different block sizes as well as 
optimal crossover values to get the highest rate of replacement. It would also be 
interesting to see how changing the watermark scheme variables would affect the 
schemes resistance to the attacks. 
• Testing against different watermarking schemes. There are many different 
video watermarking schemes that this attack could be tested against. A beneficial 
area of work would be to create a Stirmark-like tool for video watermarks. This tool 
could implement this attack as well as other digital video watermarking attacks. 
Creation of such a tool would allow many different schemes to be tested against 
this and other video specific attacks. 
• Testing against different video sequences. Since the video sequence used was 
only five frames long it would be beneficial to look at a much longer video sequence 
to see how this affects the replacement rate. Also, the video sequence used was a 
very high movement sequence. It would be interesting to see how the attack affects 
the fidelity of a low movement video sequence. Another unknown is whether the 
video size would affect the results of the attack. Would a smaller video height and 
width decrease the replacement rate because there are less data? 
• Combine algorithms. It would be beneficial to be able to combine the fidelity 
produced swap algorithm with the percentage of replacement produced by the 
replacement algorithm. An algorithm that combines the two ideas might produce 
some interesting results and probably improve the ability to remove the watermark 
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while maintaining a level of fidelity. This might be accomplished by using the 
replacement algorithm and keeping a record of each replacement such that no 
search block could be used twice. It would be interesting to see if such an algorithm 
would. have a high percentage of replacement while maintaining a high level of 
fidelity. 
• Increase efficiency of algorithms. Due to the large number of computations 
that this attack performs, it takes a long time to run, even on a video sequence of 
five frames. For this attack to be practical as applied to longer video sequences, 
the amount of computations must be reduced. One way of doing this would be 
to maintain a record of comparisons already made, so that two blocks are not 
compared more than once. Another possible way would be to implement a region 
filter such that only similar regions of blocks would be compared. 
• DifFerent shaped blocks. Another interesting test would be to determine the 
effect of different shaped blocks. Linear blocks were used in both the swap and 
replacement algorithm. It might be beneficial to look at two dimensional square or 
rectangular blocks. Irregular shaped blocks that outline major figures in a frame 
might also be beneficial to explore. 
• Combine attacks. A watermarking scheme must be resistant to all attacks as 
well as combinations of attacks to be successful. It would be of interest to look at 
combining this attack with other types of attacks such as those in Stirmark. Also, 
another attack could be built into this replacement attack. For instance it would 
be interesting to pool all blocks that were in-between the thresholds and use the 
idea of an averaging attack to average the blocks together to create a block for 
replacement . 
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